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Abstract Path Diversification is a new mechanism that can
be used to select multiple paths between a given ingress
and egress node pair using a quantified diversity measure
to achieve maximum flow reliability. The path diversifica-
tion mechanism is targeted at the end-to-end layer, but can
be applied at any level for which a path discovery service
is available. Path diversification also takes into account ser-
vice requirements for low-latency or maximal reliability in
selecting appropriate paths. Using this mechanism will al-
low future internetworking architectures to exploit naturally
rich physical topologies to a far greater extent than is possi-
ble with shortest-path routing or equal-cost load balancing.
We describe the path diversity metric and its application at
various aggregation levels, and apply the path diversification
process to 13 real-world network graphs as well as 4 syn-
thetic topologies to asses the gain in flow reliability. Based
on the analysis of flow reliability across a range of networks,
we then extend our path diversity metric to create a compos-
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ite compensated total graph diversity metric that is represen-
tative of a particular topology’s survivability with respect to
distributed simultaneous link and node failures. We tune the
accuracy of this metric having simulated the performance
of each topology under a range of failure severities, and
present the results. The topologies used are from national-
scale backbone networks with a variety of characteristics,
which we characterize using standard graph-theoretic met-
rics. The end result is a compensated total graph diversity
metric that accurately predicts the survivability of a given
network topology.
Keywords path diversification · geographic diversity ·
multi-path routing · multi-path transport protocols ·
network resilience · survivability · disruption tolerance ·
dependability · reliability · availability · performability ·
topology · measurement
1 Introduction and Motivation
Many of today’s networked devices have access to multi-
ple partial or complete physical layer paths between end-
points, but are unable to benefit from them due to design
decisions in the current Internet protocol stack that assume
unipath routing. Depending on the application, the benefits
of using multiple paths can be in the form of improved per-
formance, increased dependability, or both. With global de-
pendence on networks in general, and the Internet in par-
ticular, increasing on a daily basis, designing resilience into
future networks and improving the resilience of existing net-
works is more important than ever. Resilience is the ability of
the network to provide and maintain an acceptable level of
service in the face of various faults and challenges to nor-
mal operation [43,44,16], and is a superset of many other
disciplines including survivability, fault tolerance, disrup-
tion tolerance, dependability, and performability. In this pa-
per we focus on the dependability aspects, recognizing that
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additional mechanisms are needed to optimize performance
gains across multiple paths in real time (e.g. [11]).
The Internet architecture had survivability in the face of
failures as a design goal [12]. It has also proven its resilience
on a large scale, in large part due to the distributed nature of
its components and operational protocols [26]. In spite of
this, it quickly becomes apparent that there is a fragility to
the performance of any given network application. Unseen
perturbations in the network’s operational state may result
in an end-user experience that is far from optimal. Many ap-
plications attempt to disguise these lower-level failures, and
some are quite successful, however this is only possible with
significant programming overhead on a per-application ba-
sis and is not optimal from a network perspective. The goal
of path diversification is to provide a unified interface to a
service that is as reliable as the underlying physical graph,
instead of being limited by the reliability of a particular path
as in the current model. This could alleviate much of the
programming overhead that currently exists at the applica-
tion level, providing a level of service not possible with the
limited information currently provided to the end systems.
At the same time, doing so requires that the end-to-end ser-
vice be informed of application requirements in terms of
throughput and upper delay bounds, given that there is an in-
herent tradeoff between maximizing path diversity and min-
imizing path stretch [33].
The contributions of this work are as follows:
– formal definitions of the path diversity family of metrics
– Path Diversification selection algorithm for choosing a
set of diverse paths (including fully and partially disjoint
paths) while meeting performance constraints
– analysis of path diversity metrics showing them to be
complementary to existing graph theoretic properties, and
highly correlated to network survivability
The Path Diversity metric and its aggregate properties are
applied to node pairs and complete network graphs. Based
on this notion of diversity we then present Path Diversi-
fication, which is a heuristic algorithm designed to select
the most advantageous subset of available diverse paths be-
tween two nodes in a network under particular application
constraints. It yields several derived metrics reflecting some
of the characteristics of the selected paths, as well as the
network as a whole. We then explore how path diversifica-
tion improves reliability by comparing it both to the con-
ventional unipath approach and the real connectivity of the
underlying topology, which forms the upper performance
bound in our case. We do not evaluate different path dis-
covery mechanisms, but assume the availability of a path
database that corresponds to the physical topology as has
been proposed in the context of the PostModern Internet-
work Architecture [7]. We then quantify the survivability of
network topologies so that new or modified topologies may
easily be compared quantitatively.
1.1 Terminology
While we try to maintain consistency with all widely ac-
cepted definitions, there are a few key terms defined here:
– Robustness: The ability of a system to maintain specified
features when subject to assemblages of perturbations
either internal or external. [25]
– Reliability: The ability to perform a required function
under stated conditions for a specified period of time. [50]
– Resilience: The ability of the network to provide and
maintain an acceptable level of service in the face of var-
ious faults and challenges to normal operation. [43,44,
16] Resilience is a superset of many other disciplines.
– Node pair: Any two nodes at the same hierarchical level
of a particular network topology, e.g. two core nodes or
two subscriber nodes.
– Path: Any complete set of nodes and links that form a
loop-free connection between a node-pair.
– Path stretch: The ratio of the number of hops on a given
path, divided by the number of hops on the shortest path.
– Flow: A data association between a node-pair which may
be distributed over one or more paths.
– Application: The higher-level entity that specifies the
service requirements of a particular flow. This may re-
fer to a traditional software application, or an alternative
motivating factor, such as an SLA (service level agree-
ment) in the context of an ISP network.
– Node degree: “The number of non-loop edges contain-
ing [the node], plus twice the number of loops contain-
ing [the node].” [54]
– Clustering coefficient: “A measure of how many nodes
form triangular subgraphs with their adjacent nodes.” [27]
or “The fraction of paths of length two in the network
that are closed” [34], which may be interpreted as “A
measure of degree to which nodes in a graph tend to
cluster together.” [3]
– Diameter: The maximum shortest-path between any node-
pair.
– Radius: The minimum of the maximum shortest-path for
all nodes.
– Hop-count: The average shortest-path between all node-
paris.
– Closeness: “The mean distance from a vertex to other
vertices.” [35] Closeness is a measure of centrality and
is related to node degree.
– Betweenness: “Betweenness is the number of shortest
paths passing through a node or link and provides a cen-
trality or importantness measure.” [29,19]
1.2 Design Goals
In order to achieve resilience, an end-to-end flow should be
able to exploit diversity to the degree that it is present in the
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physical network graph. Current unipath mechanisms that
rely on shortest-hop single-path routing cannot accomplish
this. A resilient multipath mechanism should have the fol-
lowing design goals in providing service to higher layers:
– High flow reliability: Once established, a flow should
remain stable as long as the underlying physical network
is not partitioned.
– End-system control: The end systems or application
should have some control over the paths selected.
– Optimal paths: The paths chosen should be the best
available given the application’s service requirements.
– Minimal impact: There should not be a negative impact
on the network as a whole. (i.e. due to required control
messages or duplication of data for redundancy)
Section 3.4 formally describes the algorithm used in path
diversification to meet these goals.
The remaining sections of the paper are organized as fol-
lows: In Section 2 we present background and related re-
search. Section 3 presents the path diversification mecha-
nism itself. Section 4 explains our evaluation methodology
and presents our findings. Section 5 compares the surviv-
ability of our 17 topologies. Section 6 ranks these topologies
and presents a new composite metric for predicting network
survivability, and Section 7 concludes this paper.
2 Background and Related Work
While the current Internet architecture limits the use of mul-
tipath technologies, a significant amount of research has been
done in this area. This section presents some characteristic
examples of existing research and its relation to path diver-
sification.
2.1 Network Survivability
The study of network survivability is an extension of the
study of fault-tolerance, which is the ability of a system to
tolerate faults such that service failures do not result. Fault
tolerance generally covers random single or at most a few
failures, and is thus a subset of survivability [43,44,42]. The
current level of reliance on the Internet in modern nations
has led to the understanding that fault-tolerant designs were
not sufficient and that diversity in multiple forms is needed
to prevent multiple parts of the infrastructure from sharing
fate and thereby protect against correlated failures [44,9].
Survivability is the capability of a system to fulfill its
mission, in a timely manner, in the presence of threats such
as attacks or large-scale disasters. This definition captures
the aspect of correlated failures due to an attack by an intel-
ligent adversary [15,45], as well as failures of large parts of
the network infrastructure [30,4,44,9].
Based on this definition, survivability may encompass
a broad spectrum of failure scenarios, however the aspect
about which we are concerned in this paper is the ability of
a topology to remain connected (the acceptable service) [41,
42] while undergoing multiple simultaneous node and link
failures (due to external challenges) [10,9].
2.2 Graph Theoretic Approach
The problem of finding paths through a network has been
well studied in the context of graph theory [49] as well as
routing and fiber network planning. The existing algorithms
are based on different characteristics such as shortest paths,
diverse, and disjoint paths [21], and optical restorability [22].
Several algorithms exist to find the shortest path or k-shortest
paths that include the earliest shortest path algorithms by
Ford [18], Moore [32], Dijkstra [14], and Floyd [17], along
with several modifications that address negative cycles and
improve on, or in some cases, trade time and space complex-
ities [6]. Following the shortest path between a pair of nodes,
several algorithms were proposed to find the k-shortest paths,
which involve simple techniques such as manipulation of
edge weights to highly optimized algorithms [28].
Furthermore, the concept of diverse paths has been in-
vestigated to find a pair of diverse paths, k-diverse paths,
and k-shortest diverse paths. The existing literature covers
techniques based on shortest path algorithms with the incre-
mental removal of used edges to graph transformations [47,
48]. Bhandari presents efficient algorithms to compute edge-
disjoint and vertex-disjoint paths [6], however, these algo-
rithms are based on finding completely disjoint paths. Bhan-
dari also discusses an algorithm that finds the maximally di-
verse paths between a pair of nodes using a modified Dijk-
stra’s algorithm.
In this paper we use a method that draws heavily on
Bhandari’s maximally-diverse paths, however we consider
the contribution of partially disjoint paths to diversity. We
further expand the diversity measure by applying it to a set
of nodes and to a full graph. We apply our algorithm to a
network scenario in which the objective is to find a set of
paths such that the diversity of individual node pairs as well
as the overall diversity of the network exceeds a minimum
threshold. Work has been done to characterize ISP networks
in terms of the redundancy present in their physical layer
graphs [51]. Our work is consistent with these efforts when
applied in the same context.
2.3 Multipath Routing
Multipath at the network layer does not have the same end-
to-end semantics as it does at the transport layer, however
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there have been a number of proposed multipath routing ap-
proaches that may have counterpart mechanisms at the trans-
port layer.
Path Splicing [33] uses multiple destination-rooted rout-
ing trees to provide multiple alternative paths that may be
switched between at any intermediate node. In this approach,
the source node is given control over selecting a path index
at each intermediate hop, however no information about the
paths is passed to the source so there is no basis on which
to chose a particular set of paths. The benefit is that if the
source detects packet losses and suspects a bad link, it can
randomly choose a different set of path indices much faster
than routing can reconverge, however it has no assurance
that the new path chosen will map to a different set of phys-
ical links. A similar approach is Routing Deflections in that
the source node is given some control without detailed in-
formation [55].
An alternative, which is sometimes not even thought of
as a multipath solution, is to have pre-computed back-up
routes in case of a link failure [26,20]. While this can be
faster than a full reconvergence, it still takes time for the
nodes at the location of the failure to detect failure and be-
gin using the alternate routes.
Much of the multipath routing research, such as DE-
TOUR [40], has been focused on the ad-hoc wireless en-
vironment in which channel conditions and resource con-
straints are the primary concern.
2.4 Multipath Applications
There are a number of proposed application scenarios (e.g.
video streaming [52,5]) that recognize the benefits of schedul-
ing packets across multiple disjoint paths for performance
gain or to mitigate the effects of bursty channel errors. Our
goal with respect to these scenarios is to expose a well-
defined set of control parameters (knobs) that allow the ap-
plication to express its service level requirements without
placing the full burden of discovering the optimal set of
paths on the application itself.
3 Path Diversification Overview
The primary objective of path diversification is to select mul-
tiple paths that are as diverse as possible, while limiting the
path stretch if necessary. Instantiating path diversification at
any level will require the following four functions:
1. Path database indexed by source-destination pairs and
including the unique identifiers for each node and link
traversed. This database can be an exhaustive compila-
tion or filtered based on administrative policy.
2. Quantified path diversity using the path diversity metric
explained in the following section.
3. Path selection based on higher-level specifications to eval-
uate the tradeoff between path diversity and path stretch.
4. Packet forwarding based on the source routes distilled
from the selected paths.
There are many possible implementations of the path
discovery database and packet forwarding mechanisms, and
path diversification is agnostic to this implementations, as
long as the two are decoupled to allow greater flexibility in
exploiting the inherent diversity of heterogeneous internet-
works [7]. The following sections discuss the measurement
of path diversity and the selection of diverse paths.
3.1 Path Diversity
Since the primary motivation for implementing the path di-
versification mechanism is to increase resilience, paths should
be chosen such that they will not experience correlated fail-
ures. To this end, we define a measure of diversity (originally
introduced in [38] and refined in [37]) that quantifies the de-
gree to which alternate paths share the same nodes and links.
Note that in the WAN context in which we are concerned
with events and connections on a large geographic scale, a
node may be thought of as representing an entire PoP, and a
link as the physical bundle of fibers buried in a given right-
of-way. This distinction between WAN and LAN component
identifiers affects only the population of the path database,
not the usage of the diversity metric.
Definition 1 (Path) Given a (source s, destination d) node
pair, a path P between them is a vector containing all links
L and all intermediate nodes N traversed by that path
P = L∪N (1)
and the length of this path |P| is the combined total number
of elements in L and N.
Definition 2 (Path diversity) Let the shortest path between
a given (s, d) pair be P0. Then, for any other path Pk be-
tween the same source and destination, we define the diver-
sity function D(Pk) with respect to P0 as:
D(Pk) = 1− |Pk ∩P0||P0| (2)
The path diversity has a value of 1 if Pk and P0 are com-
pletely disjoint and a value of 0 if Pk and P0 are identical.
For two arbitrary paths Pa and Pb the path diversity is given
as:
D(Pb,Pa) = 1− |Pb∩Pa||Pa| (3)
where |Pa| ≤ |Pb|.




D(P1 ) = 1
D(P2 ) = 2/3
Fig. 1 Shortest path P0 and alternatives P1 and P2
It has been claimed [33] that measuring diversity (re-
ferred to as novelty) with respect to either nodes or links is
sufficient, however we assert that this is not the case. Fig-
ure 1 shows the shortest path, P0, along with the alternate
paths P1 and P2 both of which have a (link) novelty of 1.
However, given a failure on node 1, both P0 and P2 will fail.
In our approach, D(P2)= 23 , which reflects this vulnerability.
P1 on the other hand has both a novelty of 1 and a diversity
of 1, and does not share any common point of failure with
P0. Similarly, the wavelengths or fibers from multiple nodes
may in fact be spliced into a single physical link such as
was the case in the Baltimore Tunnel Fire [8,46], resulting
in a shared-risk link group (SRLG) [36], thus illustrating the
need for including both nodes and links into the diversity
measure.
3.2 Effective Path Diversity
Definition 3 (Effective path diversity) An aggregation of
path diversities for a selected set of paths between a given
node-pair (s, d). To calculate EPD we use the exponential
function
EPD = 1− e−λksd (4)






where Dmin(Pi) is the minimum diversity of path i when
evaluated against each member of the set of previously se-
lected paths {P1..Pi−1} for that pair of nodes. λ is an exper-
imentally determined constant that scales the impact of ksd
based on the utility of this added diversity.
A high value of λ (> 1) indicates lower marginal util-
ity for additional paths, while a low value of λ indicates
a higher marginal utility for additional paths. Using EPD
allows us both to bound the diversity measurement on the
range [0,1) (an EPD of 1 would indicate an infinite diver-
sity) and also reflect the decreasing marginal utility provided
by additional paths in real networks. This property is based





D(P1 ) = 1
A d
Fig. 2 Geographic diversity: distance d and area A
3.3 Geographic Path Diversity
Where geolocation tags are made available through cross
layering methods, we believe it is important to measure di-
versity in terms of physical distances, not only node and
link disjointness. The previous path diversity measures con-
sider the sharing of components, but do not capture the ge-
ographic characteristics necessary for area-based challenges
such as large-scale disasters or to prevent the geographic fate
sharing of distinct links in the same conduit as in the Balti-
more tunnel fire. Therefore we are augmenting the diver-
sity measures with a minimum distance between any pair of
nodes along alternate paths, and as the area inside a polygon
or set of polygons, the borders of which are defined by a pair
of alternate paths, as shown in Figure 2. Thus, it should be
possible to specify diverse paths among a set of candidates
with a given degree of sharing and distance metric EPD(d)
constrained by stretch, and measure the geographic area be-
tween the paths EPD(A) as well as to measure the diversity
inherent in a graph across all paths TGD(d,A). To further
that end we propose the following definition of geographic
path diversity:
Definition 4 (Geographic path diversity) Given previously
defined definitions of Pa and Pb
Dg(Pb,Pa) = αd2min+βA (6)
where dmin is the minimum distance between any member
of the vector Pa and any member of the vector Pb, and A is
the area of a polygon whose borders are formed by paths Pa
and Pb as shown in Figure 2. α and β are weighting factors
in the range [0,1].
3.4 General Path Selection Algorithm
Now, we present our path selection algorithm. Given that
the number of possible paths existing between a common
(source, destination) pair is z:
Step 1 let A be the set of available paths between a given
(source, destination) pair, in decreasing order by diversity
value, where |A|= z
Step 2 let n be the number of diverse paths required by the
transport layer
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Fig. 3 Sprint physical topology [13] in KU-TopView Fig. 4 Sprint logical topology [1] in KU-TopView
Fig. 5 VSNL logical topology [1]
Step 3 let B be the smallest contiguous subset chosen from
the beginning of A, where |B| = k and k ≥ n such that no
members of {A−B} have a diversity ≥ any member of B
B = {i ∈ A : D(Pi)> D(Pj),∀ j ∈ A} (7)
If k = n, B is the set of exactly n diverse paths required by
the transport layer and the algorithm is finished, otherwise
we continue with steps 4 through 8.
Step 4 let Dmin be the minimum diversity amongst all paths
in set B
Dmin = min[D(Pi),∀i ∈ B] (8)
Step 5 select a set C out of B which contains all the paths
with a diversity greater-than Dmin, where |C|= m
C = {i ∈ B : D(Pi)> Dmin} (9)
Step 6 let E be the remaining paths in B after removing C,
where |E|= k−m
E = B−C (10)
Fig. 6 Level 3 logical topology [1]
Step 7 select set F, to be the shortest length paths from E,
where |F |= n−m
F = {i ∈ E : |Pi| ≤ |Pj|,∀ j ∈ E} (11)
This step allows us to choose shorter paths when path diver-
sities are equivalent.
Step 8 the final set S of n diverse paths is
S =C∪F (12)
This algorithm yields the required number of paths with
the constraint that they will include the shortest path and the
maximally diverse paths with the least stretch.
3.5 Measuring Graph Diversity
The total graph diversity (TGD) is simply the average of the
EPD values of all node pairs within that graph. This allows
us to quantify the diversity that can be achieved for a partic-
ular topology, not just for a particular flow. For example a
star or tree topology will always have a TGD of 0, while a
ring topology will have a TGD of 0.6 given a λ of 1.
Here we note that for diversity to make sense in the
graph context it should be computed considering only path
components (nodes and links) at the level of network hier-
archy for which the diversity value is desired. For example,
in computing the diversity of a service provider’s backbone,
Path Diversification for Future Internet End-to-End Resilience and Survivability 7
Table 1 Network characteristics
Network Nodes Links Avg. Node TGD Clustering Diam. Radius Hopcount Closeness Node LinkDegree k = 4 Coefficient Between. Between.
Full-Mesh 20 190 19.00 0.9502 1 1 1 1 1 0 1
Manhattan Grid 25 40 3.20 0.8964 0 8 4 3.3333 0.3067 110 54
Ring 25 25 2.00 0.6321 0 12 12 6.5 0.1538 132 78
Star 25 24 1.92 0.000 0 2 1 1.92 0.5302 552 24
AboveNet 22 80 7.27 0.8559 0.6514 3 2 1.7229 0.5947 196 21
AT&T 108 141 2.61 0.5881 0.3274 6 3 3.3790 0.3030 4160 943
AT&T Phys. 361 466 2.58 0.9014 0.0550 37 19 13.57 0.0763 4527 1893
EBONE 28 66 4.71 0.8635 0.3124 4 3 2.2804 0.4507 132 42
Exodus 22 51 4.64 0.8843 0.3307 4 2 2.0563 0.4978 132 22
GE´ANT2 Phys. 34 51 3.00 0.7623 0.2898 9 5 3.4652 0.3007 556 131
Level 3 53 456 17.20 0.9154 0.7333 4 2 1.7721 0.5845 664 84
Sprint 44 106 4.82 0.8120 0.3963 5 3 2.6882 0.3853 602 129
Sprint Phys. 263 311 2.37 0.8821 0.0340 37 19 14.78 0.0700 3609 1637
Telstra 58 60 2.07 0.1295 0.2411 6 3 3.3025 0.3095 2136 806
Tiscali 51 129 5.06 0.7785 0.5068 5 3 2.4298 0.4236 656 96
Verio 122 310 5.08 0.8104 0.3509 8 4 3.1026 0.3335 3736 480
VSNL 7 7 2.00 0.2001 0.4167 4 2 2.0952 0.4982 18 12
only core nodes should be considered, otherwise the com-
paratively vast number of subscriber nodes (typically stubs)
will artificially reduce the calculated diversity. We also note
here that the diversity measure is designed such that it does
not penalize longer paths in favor of shorter paths, mean-
ing that graph diameter and average path lengths are inde-
pendent metrics that should be considered in addition to the
diversity metric. This is discussed in further detail in Sec-
tion 6.2.
3.6 Terminating Conditions
In this section we describe three different modes for choos-
ing a set of diverse paths for a given node pair: number of
paths, diversity threshold, and stretch limit. The objective
in the first mode is to find k maximally diverse paths. We
first find the shortest fully disjoint paths, and if additional
paths are required we continue finding paths that add max-
imum diversity as calculated using equation 5. The second
mode selects as many maximally diverse paths as are re-
quired to achieve the requested EPD. Finally, the third mode
selects all maximally diverse paths with stretch less than the
stretch limit. In all modes, the set of maximally diverse paths
are found using the Floyd-Warshall algorithm with modified
edge weights [17,53,6]. In this algorithm, only those paths
are used that increase the EPD for the node pair in question.
Recall that only paths with one or more disjoint elements
(links,nodes) will result in non-zero Dmin and consequently
increase EPD.
4 Evaluation
In this section we evaluate path diversification based on its
ability to reflect the connectivity of the underlying graph,
and the cost incurred in doing so in terms of path stretch.
To evaluate path diversification based on realistic topologies
we selected 13 service provider backbone network topolo-
gies (3 physical and 10 logical), and 4 synthetic topologies.
We selected a range of connectivity as shown in Figures 4, 3,
5, and 6 in order to evaluate path diversification on topolo-
gies with a broad set of property values.1 Comparing Fig-
ures 4 and 3 we can see visually how different the diversity
can be between the physical and routing layers of the same
network, as is shown numerically in the following tables.
Table 1 shows these properties for each network, as well as
a number of standard graph metrics. For interactive visual-
izations of these topologies we use our web-based network
mapping tool KU-TopView [2].
KU-TopView is a web-based tool we developed for sev-
eral reasons. It allows for visual inspection of our hand-input
topology data sets, in order to more-easily detect errors. It
also facilitates easy viewing of all the topologies in our li-
brary both for us and for those interested in our research.
Thirdly it facilitates comparison of networks by overlay-
ing one on another, and allowing selection of colors and
other visual characteristics. Lastly it is able to combine net-
works and export both the original adjacency matrices and
the combined matrices for use in other tools such as KU-
CSM (ns-3 challenge simulation module) [10].
As will be seen in more detail in the results following,
the characteristics of the topology significantly affect the di-
versity that can be attained. As mentioned earlier we assume
the presence of a path server or equivalent service to provide
the set of paths from which the selection is made. To perform
this function we implemented a variation of the maximally
diverse edge-disjoint path algorithm [6]. We implemented a
MATLAB simulation to evaluate the diversity measure and
1 Results presented in this paper are not to serve as a recommenda-
tion of one network over another for business purposes. Due to com-
mon business practices the Internet service providers listed (with the
exception of GE´ANT2) do not make their network topology data pub-
licly available, and the data sets used are inferred by third parties.
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Fig. 8 Total graph diversity vs. effective path diversity threshold
necessary supporting functions. Before examining the per-
formance of path diversification with respect to flow relia-
bility and stretch, we will look at its ability to improve the
useable diversity of the graph as a whole.
4.1 Diversity
By applying the diversity measure to the selected path set
of an entire graph, we observe the effectiveness of the path
diversification process. To do this we select a set of paths
based on a given k or EPD threshold, and then calculate the
TGD based on that set of paths.
In Figures 7, 8, and 9 we observe that most of the 17
topologies share similar characteristics in terms of the diver-
sity available, although the absolute value of diversity that
can be attained varies significantly. Selecting k most diverse
paths between nodes in the AT&T and GE´ANT2 graphs re-
sults in a strong increase in diversity for k < 4 with limited
improvement for additional paths, as we observe in Figure 7,
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Fig. 9 Total graph diversity vs. path-stretch limit
substantial improvement for k < 6. This emphasizes the fact
that basing a diversity metric on a particular number of di-
verse paths is highly topology dependent. Figure 8 gives the
TGD with respect to EPD threshold, which shows similar
relative diversity values for the most of the topologies, but
compresses many of the curves into a smaller vertical region,
due to the fact that the measure itself is adaptive to the topol-
ogy. Some of the curves in this figure exhibit a stair-step
shape, caused by highly-uniform topologies in which a large
number of the flows must add an additional path to meet the
same incremental EPD threshold increase. This is most pro-
nounced for the full-mesh topology, which being perfectly
uniformity, has the property that all flows must have exactly
the same number of paths to meet a given EPD threshold
requirement. From Figure 9 we observe that in most cases,
virtually no additional diversity is gained beyond a stretch
threshold of 3.
4.2 Dependability
A flow is established between each node pair using a set
of paths determined using the path diversification algorithm
and the specified diversity threshold value. To simulate link
failures we remove each link from the graph based on a
fixed probability of failure. To simulate node failures we re-
move all links connected to a particular node based on a
fixed probability of failure for that node. A flow is consid-
ered reliable if at least one of its paths remains unbroken
by the link or node failures. We compute flow robustness to
be the number of reliable flows, divided by the total number
of flows in the network. For each probability of failure, we
also determine the the best flow robustness possible for any
path-selection mechanism given the partitioning of the un-
derlying graph (by calculating the fraction of node-pairs still
connected), and show this value in each plot with the label
“Best”. Finally, we, calculate the flow robustness using only
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Fig. 11 Flow robustness vs. node failures, Sprint logical
the conventional shortest path for each node pair to serve as
a lower performance bound, k = 1.
To accomplish all this, we start with the set of paths be-
tween all node pairs in the network selected by path diver-
sification to meet a particular path-diversity threshold. We
then remove each each edge of the graph independently with
probability p. After calculating the resulting flow robustness
we reset the graph and repeat the process 100 times for each
probability p before continuing to the next path-diversity
threshold. Each point plotted is the average of these 100 tri-
als, and the error bars represent 95% confidence intervals.2
Taking the Sprint logical topology as an example, we
show the flow robustness in the face of random link failures
(Figure 10), node failures (Figure 11), and combined link
and node failures (Figure 12). In the link-failure case we can
clearly see that the improvement from k = 1 to k = 2 is the
2 In order to keep the number of figures manageable we show
plots from a few representative topologies. The plots for the en-
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Fig. 13 Flow robustness vs. node failures, Sprint physical
most significant (>30% improvement with a 25% probabil-
ity of failure), and that with k = 6 we are getting pretty close
to the upper bound of the graph connectivity (the fraction of
node pairs not partitioned from each other, represented by
the ‘Best’ curve on the plots). In the node-failure case we
note three points of interest. First the confidence intervals
are much larger, due to the fact that on average a single node
affects more flows than a single link resulting in a coarser
granularity of simulation results and more variance from one
run to the next with the same probability of failure. Sec-
ond, the network connectivity (shown by the curve labeled
‘Best’) drops much more rapidly than it did with only link
failures, with only 40% connectivity with a 25% failure rate,
as opposed to the 80% connectivity with only link failures.
Third, we see that there is much less room for improvement
between k = 1 and the upper bound, and that k = 2 closely
approaches the upper bound. When we combine node and
link failures, the network connectivity is only slightly worse
than with node failures alone, however the single-path case





















0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25





















0.00 0.05 0.10 0.15 0.20 0.25
Fig. 15 Flow robustness vs. node & link failures, VSNL logical
drops nearly 50%, to less than 20% of flows surviving at a
25% failure rate.
To understand the dependability of a few networks with
significantly different properties than the Sprint logical topol-
ogy (Figure 4), we have selected the Sprint physical net-
work (Figure 3), the Level 3 logical topology (Figure 6),
and the VSNL logical topology (Figure 5). We see that the
network connectivity of the Sprint physical network drops
fairly quickly, and in this case even selecting 10 paths is not
sufficient to utilize all of the diversity available in the net-
work. This may be due in part to the Floyd-Warshall heuris-
tic algorithm being used to populate our path database and
we expect that the results would be improved when using
a distributed exhaustive path discovery algorithm. In look-
ing at the Level 3 network with link failures, we see that its
high degree of connectivity keeps nearly 100% connected
throughout the range of failure probabilities simulated, how-
ever using a single-path algorithm still results in 40% of the
flows being disrupted. Choosing 6 paths approaches the up-
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Fig. 18 Resilience of path diversity, Sprint physical topology
the spectrum, the VSNL is very poorly connected, resulting
in a rapid drop in connectivity as links and nodes fail, and
a situation where there are almost no alternate paths so path
diversification provides almost no improvement over single-
path routing.
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Table 2 Aggregate resilience of path diversity
Number of paths Aggregate Resilience R
k = 1 k = 2 k = 3 k = 10
AT&T physical 0.38858 0.43021 0.45076 0.47638
GE´ANT2 physical 0.48909 0.62584 0.64619 0.65773
Sprint physical 0.40013 0.42458 0.43445 0.45063
4.2.1 Resilience Improvement
By using the ResiliNets resilience metrics framework [31,
23,41,42,24], we can show that path diversification does
improve the resilience (R) of the network. The resilience
framework allows us to take multiple properties of the net-
work operational conditions (shown on the x-axis), and show
the corresponding states of the service being provided at
a particular layer boundary, both as objective functions of
multiple parameters. In this case we are interested in the
condition of the network topology, captured using the largest
component size (LC size) and clustering coefficient. The ser-
vice being provided is end-to-end connectivity, the state of
which is captured using path reliability and average stretch,
reflecting the service goal of connectivity with limited stretch.
Plots resulting from this framework show the normal
state (normal network conditions and acceptable service per-
formance) near the origin, with network conditions degrad-
ing to the right on the x-axis and service performance de-
grading upwards on the y-axis. A resilient network is one
that stays in the normal operating condition while undergo-
ing challenges, and a resilient service is one that stays in the
acceptable service state as the network degrades. We quan-
tify the degree to which a service degrades as the network
operating coditions degrade using the area under each curve,
and quantify R as the total area minus the area under the
curve in question, normalized on a scale from zero to one.
We use the AT&T, GE´ANT2, and Sprint physical-layer
networks as examples, as shown in Figures 16, 17, and 18.
In the axis lables for each plot, p1 represents path reliability,
p2 represents stretch, n1 represents largest component size,
and n2 represents clustering coefficient. For each network
we plot services using 1, 2, 3, and 10 paths, and note that
in each case using a greater number of diverse paths results
in a service that stays closer to the x-axis as network condi-
tions degrade. We see the most dramatic improvement in the
case of the GE´ANT network, while in the cases of AT&T
and Sprint rapidly increasing stretch limits the performance
improvement available through path diversity. Table 2 quan-
tifies the improvement in R aggregated across the full range
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Fig. 20 Gain vs. effective path diversity threshold where λ = .5
4.3 Path Stretch
By definition, if we are using paths other than the shortest-
path as determined by conventional routing mechanisms, those
paths will be longer, and this is measured in terms of path
stretch as defined previously. Depending on the particular
topology in use, and the source-destination pair being mea-
sured, some paths will be several times as long as the orig-
inal, while others will be only slightly longer, and a partic-
ular flow will be composed of paths with varying stretch.
To evaluate the effect of path diversification at the graph
level we define average path stretch (APS) to be the aver-
age stretch over all selected paths between a give source-
destination pair. The total graph stretch TGS is then the av-
erage of the APS values for all node pairs in the graph. We
can then plot TGS with respect to EPD to determine the cost
of increased diversity in terms of path stretch. As seen in
Figure 19, the response of TGS to increasing EPD threshold
is significantly topology dependent. The TGS of the ring is
unchanged by increasing EPD, due to the existence of only 1
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Fig. 22 Gain vs. number of paths requested
alternate path, which on average is significantly longer than
the primary path. The TGS of several topologies increases
at a relatively linear rate, indicative of the relatively high de-
gree of connectivity in those networks. In contrast, the Sprint
physical and full mesh have distinct thresholds near EPD
values of 0.4 and 0.6, due their particular characteristics. In
most of the networks we observe that the stretch remains
less than double even for very high EPD thresholds.
While we see that stretch is likely to increase when se-
lecting diverse paths, we want to observe the relationship be-
tween diversity and stretch. To this end we calculate a gain,
which is the ratio of TGD divided by TGS for a particu-
lar requested EPD threshold. This normalizes the diversity
improvement seen to the increased cost in terms of stretch.
Figures 20, 21, and 22 quantify small increases in path di-
versity result in a large improvement in overall graph di-
versity, while incurring minimal stretch, however this effect
is limited by the underlying topologies such that when no
new diverse paths are available the ratio becomes constant.
Networks with little diversity, or a large amount of stretch
appear at the bottom of this plot, namely the synthetic star
and ring, as well as the poorly connected Telstra and VSNL
provider networks. Comparing Figure 20 and Figure 21 we
observe the effect of modifying λ . When λ is increased, the
improvement in diversity does not come until higher EPD
thresholds (due to the increased impact of k on EPD), how-
ever the overall gain is higher. Figure 22 shows the same
gain measure when plotted against k, and again emphasizes
the role played by the underlying topology. In this case the
Sprint topology is still showing improved gain well after the
other two have flatlined.
Here we note that a multipath-aware application would
likely not use all reliable paths equally, so averaging the
stretch of all paths overestimates the effective stretch in that
case.
5 Topology Survivability Comparison
In comparing the survivability of various topologies for this
paper, we are concerned not with the performance of a par-
ticular protocol or mechanism in recovering from failures,
rather we are considering the survivability inherent in the
structure of the topology itself. To do that, we calculate the
flow robustness as the probability of link and node failures
is increased. In this case we are considering a flow to be
in tact as long as a path exists that connects the source and
destination, i.e. the source and destination nodes are not par-
titioned from one another. Questions of reconvergence time
and path protection accuracy are all protocol specific and
outside the scope of this paper. We compare 17 topologies, 4
of which are synthetic topologies included for completeness.
Ten topologies are logical router-level topologies inferred by
the Rocketfuel project [1]. The remaining three are physical-
layer fiber topologies [13]. Figures 3 and 4 show the physical
and logical-layer topologies respectively for the Sprint net-
work, as an example of the substantial differences between
these two categories of maps. The synthetic topologies can
be easily recreated based on the data in the tables below,
and the data (including adjacency matrices and node geolo-
cations) for the real topologies is available via KU-TopView,
our Web-based topology map viewer [2].
5.1 Simulation Results
To perform the failure simulations we again use MATLAB
since we are not looking at dynamic or transient behavior
and therefore do not need to simulate packet flows but can
perform the calculations using graph-theoretic methods. For
each of the 17 topologies we use the following process:
1. load topology adjacency matrix
2. calculate 300 failure sets based on current probability
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Fig. 24 Node failure robustness (synthetic)
(a) 100 sets with link-failures only
(b) 100 sets with node-failures only
(c) 100 sets with link & node failures
3. calculate fraction of node-pairs connected in each set
4. average across each 100 sets
5. plot 3 data points
6. increment failure-probability until all values range are
complete
For this paper we use 51 failure probabilities evenly dis-
tributed over the range 0–0.5 inclusive, resulting in 15,300
simulation runs for each topology, or 260,100 runs total,
which took several days to complete using a computing clus-
ter consisting of approximately 1000 Intel Xeon CPU cores.
The results of this process are summarized in Figures 23–31.
These plots are a collection of the best-possible or reference
curves that would appear on a plot comparing routing or path
protection schemes. The curve for each plot is distinct due
to its topology, and thus from these plots we can quickly see
which topologies are more survivable than others. We have
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Fig. 26 Link failure robustness (logical)
and synthetic, for plotting purposes simply for readability
because they became difficult to distinguish with too many
curves in each plot. At this point we can also take note of
specific topology’s performance, for example the full-mesh
does best overall, while the ring is the worst of the synthetic
topologies, and the Sprint and AT&T physical topologies do
the worst overall. What we take away from these plots is
that the relative ordering of the curves remains largely un-
changed (the few exceptions are of minimal size) and so it
is reasonable to expect that a measure of survivability may
be computed based on the topology alone, without being de-
pendent on the expected probability of failure of individual
links and nodes.
5.2 Topology Characteristics Survey
Table 1 in Section 4 lists all of the topologies analyzed,
along with a set of standard graph-metrics. For each met-
ric, the best (w.r.t. survivability) three values are highlighted
in bold. A number of these features are linked to network
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Fig. 28 Node & link failure robustness (logical)
resilience in one way or another, for example topologies
with a high average node-degree generally have more pro-
tection paths available, while topologies with a high maxi-
mum node or link betweenness may have a central point-of-
failure which could be targeted by an attacker. Diameter, ra-
dius, and hop-count are closely related distance metrics. In
our eariler work on path diversification [37] (with a much
smaller sample-set of topologies available to work with) it
became apparent that the TGD metric was able to differen-
tiate similar topologies according to their survivability per-
formance, but looking at the plots and Table 1 it is clear
that this no longer holds true when the network size varies
widely. None of the listed graph theory metrics (or any we
are aware of) correlate closely to network survivability as
simulated in Section 5.1. We address this void in Section 6.
6 Analysis
In this section we further explore the relationships between
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Fig. 30 Node failure robustness (physical)
We also present a new metric (cTGD introduced in [39]) to
quantify this relationship.
6.1 Topology Ranking
Based on the flow robustness results (Section 5.1) we can
rank the topologies based on their survivability in the pres-
ence of multiple failures as shown in Table 3. This rank-
ing can easily be done qualitatively by visual inspection of
the plots above, with higher curves outranking lower curves.
To perform the ranking a bit more rigorously we chose a
fixed point on the x-axis (0.2 in this case) and ranked each
topology according to its value at that point on the link and
node failure plot. Since the curves have minimal crossover,
this produces the same ranking as the visual inspection ap-
proach. The metrics values from Table 1 are also shown here
as rankings in order to emphasize the correlation (or lack
thereof) between each particular metric and the survivability
rank. Some metrics are not included in this table, for exam-
ple the number of nodes and links that are a direct measure
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Table 3 Network rank
Network Survivability Node Deg. TGD Clustering Diam. Hopcount Closeness Node Bet. Link Bet.Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank Rank
Full-Mesh 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
Level 3 2 2 2 2 4 2 3 10 9
AboveNet 3 3 8 3 3 3 2 5 3
Exodus 4 5 5 8 4 5 6 4 4
EBONE 5 5 7 10 4 7 7 4 6
Tiscali 6 4 11 4 5 8 8 9 10
Sprint 7 5 9 6 5 9 9 8 11
Verio 8 4 10 7 7 10 10 13 13
Manhattan Grid 9 6 4 15 7 12 12 3 7
VSNL 10 7 15 5 4 6 5 2 2
GE´ANT2 Phys. 11 6 12 11 8 14 14 7 12
Star 12 8 17 15 2 4 4 6 5
AT&T 13 7 14 9 6 13 13 14 15
Telstra 14 7 16 12 6 11 11 11 14
Ring 15 7 13 15 9 15 15 4 8
AT&T Phys. 16 7 3 13 10 16 16 15 17
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Fig. 31 Node & link failure robustness (physical)
of the graph size, and are not a unique property of the topol-
ogy design, and the radius, which is so closely related to the
diameter and the hop-count as to be redundant. In contrast,
the average node degree relates the number of nodes to the
number of links.
From Table 3 we see that most of the metrics correctly
rank the top 2 or 3 networks according to their survivability,
but beyond that the rank no longer corresponds. Based on
previous experience with the path diversity metrics, and the
intuition that diversity should be closely correlated with sur-
vivability, we investigated further and developed the Com-
pensated Total Graph Diversity metric.
6.2 Compensated Total Graph Diversity
In Section 3.5 we noted that the diversity metric is indepen-
dent of path length, meaning that there is no natural penalty
assigned to longer paths as opposed to short ones. On the
other hand, there is a significant statistical penalty to long
paths when simulating probabilistic failures. Intuitively this
penalty results from greater exposure in real networks to
component failure due to natural faults or intentional attack.
Returning to Table 1 we see that specific topologies receive a
much higher TGD-rank than survivability-rank (e.g. AT&T
Physical, Sprint Physical) also have much higher diameters
than other networks with similar TGDs. Conversely, the star
topology, which is given the lowest TGD rank but performs
better than 5 other networks, has a much smaller diame-
ter than the networks it outperforms. Further investigation
shows that the average hop-count is a more precise indicator
of this penalty than the diameter or radius. Based on this we
propose a new composite metric that takes into account both
TGD and average hop-count.
We call the new metric Compensated Total Graph Diver-
sity (cTGD) and define it as follows:
cTGD = eTGD−1×h−α (13)
where h is the average hop-count and α is a parameter tuned
experimentally. We find that α = 1.25 gives the best correla-
tion to our simulation results. The benefit of taking the expo-
nential of the original TGD is that the range is still bounded
between 0 and 1, but is no longer inclusive of 0, which al-
lows for the cTGD of a topology with 0 diversity to be pos-
itive, as in the case of the Star network. From the hop-count
component we desire an inverse relationship (higher hop-
counts result in lower cTGDs), and we use the α parameter
to tune the aggressiveness of this relationship. To put equa-
tion 13 in the context of providing an end-to-end service,
it requires greater diversity to provide a given level of flow
reliability over a long path than is required to achieve the
same level of flow reliability over a short path. In the graph
context, a large-diameter graph must provide a higher TGD
to achieve the same level of flow-robustness as a smaller-
diameter graph with a lower TGD.
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Table 4 Compensated TGD
Network Survivability cTGD cTGDRank Rank
Full-Mesh 1 0.9514 1
Level 3 2 0.4494 2
AboveNet 3 0.4386 3
Exodus 4 0.3617 4
EBONE 5 0.3113 5
Tiscali 6 0.2641 6
Sprint 7 0.2407 7
Verio 8 0.2009 8
Manhattan Grid 9 0.2002 9
VSNL 10 0.1783 10
GE´ANT2 Phys. 11 0.1668 11
Star 12 0.1628 12
AT&T 13 0.1446 13
Telstra 14 0.0941 14
Ring 15 0.0667 15
AT&T Phys. 16 0.0348 16
Sprint Phys. 17 0.0307 17
Table 4 again shows the topologies ranked according to
their simulated survivability results, alongside their cTGD
metric value and cTGD rank. We see that both measures
provide an identical ranking for all the topologies suggesting
that the cTGD metric is an excellent predictor of topology
survivability. We note here that we are not claiming that this
exact correlation would hold true for every possible set of
topologies, only that we expect a close correlation. The rea-
son for this is that the TGD is a heuristic measure, and the
survivability rank is based on a Monte Carlo simulation set,
both of with introduce a margin of error. We have sought to
reduce this error as much as possible through our method-
ology. That being said, what we are seeing is a strong cor-
relation so that any reordering should only occur when two
topologies have very similar cTGD and survivability metric
values to begin with.
7 Conclusions and Future Work
This paper described path diversification, presenting its de-
sign and evaluation. We also discussed several metrics for
evaluating path, node-pair, and graph diversity. We applied
the path diversification mechanism to a number of real net-
works and evaluated its ability to improve flow robustness
in the presence of link and node failures. Path diversifica-
tion provides a substantial performance improvement over
conventional single-path mechanisms by using cross-layer
information to make intelligent path selections based on the
diversity. We then extended the applicability of the total graph
diversity metric by compensating for topologies that have
higher average hopcounts, thus creating the cTGD metric.
Our analysis of the properties of 17 real and synthetic topolo-
gies shows that cTGD is an excellent predictor of the sur-
vivability of these topologies when simultaneous distributed
node and link failures occur.
We select a static set of paths in order to limit complexity
and bound the problem, however this is not strictly neces-
sary. As paths fail additional paths could be requested from
path server (assuming resilient access to the path server).
This sort of on-demand path selection could limit the ini-
tial computational complexity and is something that merits
further investigation. Future work includes evaluating cTGD
on a large set of generated topologies engineered with spe-
cific properties (node degree, rank, etc.) to characterize the
effect of those characteristics on survivability, as well as ex-
panding the scope of our survivability simulations to include
various types of intelligently targeted challenges.
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